Corruption hits hospitals, water before courts act

When corruption contributes to a dysfunctional hospital, poor schooling or an unreliable water supply, the people who depend on those services carry the cost long before any court delivers a verdict. By the time a conviction is secured, the bribe has been paid, the contract manipulated and the money hidden. A guilty verdict years later cannot undo the damage to the public institutions citizens rely on. That gap between harm and remedy is the starting point of preliminary research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which argues that South Africa has powerful tools to prevent corruption before more damage is done, and that it does not need to wait for criminal convictions to use them.

This is not an argument against prosecution. Serious corruption is a crime, and successful prosecutions are essential to upholding the rule of law and combating impunity. For many South Africans, accountability means investigating and prosecuting those responsible, and understandably so. But criminal prosecution is a difficult, slow and inherently limited means of dealing with graft. Complex cases typically involve huge amounts of financial and digital evidence, many accused, complicated corporate structures and transactions across national jurisdictions. Success requires good investigations, forensic expertise, international cooperation and functioning courts.

The country’s capacity to deliver even that is constrained. In August, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts highlighted a vacancy rate of almost 50% in the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, known as the Hawks, along with difficulties retaining experienced investigators and forensic specialists. The committee also expressed concern about the many corruption referrals that had not resulted in prosecutions.

Those implicated in major corruption may also have considerable resources to challenge proceedings repeatedly. South African courts have referred to “Stalingrad” litigation tactics, in which wealthy accused contest virtually every step of a prosecution. In the Jacob Zuma arms deal litigation, underway for over two decades, the Supreme Court of Appeal observed that such a strategy benefitted an accused able to secure the best lawyers.

The deeper limitation, however, is timing. Prosecution is almost always retrospective, which is why the ISS argues that South Africa must fight corruption further upstream, intervening earlier to stop wrongdoing and limit its consequences. Its preliminary research shows that state institutions possess an array of administrative, regulatory, financial, disciplinary and civil powers that can be used against corruption. Many can be exercised without a criminal conviction, and some do not depend on a criminal case being brought at all.

The tools are concrete. When statutory requirements are met, the Financial Intelligence Centre can direct an institution not to proceed with a suspicious transaction for up to 10 days while it makes inquiries. The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) can institute civil proceedings to recover state losses and prevent potential ones. The Special Tribunal, which adjudicates civil proceedings arising from SIU investigations, can grant suspension orders and interdicts that halt disputed contracts or other conduct while a case is being decided. An unlawful contract can potentially be stopped without waiting for a corruption prosecution.

Financial regulators, including the Financial Sector Conduct Authority and the Prudential Authority, can restrict activities, suspend or revoke licences, and remove or debar individuals from parts of the financial sector. The Auditor-General can refer a material irregularity for investigation and trigger remedial action; where those responsible for a public institution’s financial management fail to act and financial loss results, the Auditor-General can issue a certificate of debt requiring repayment to the state. National Treasury, meanwhile, manages the List of Restricted Suppliers and the Register for Tender Defaulters, so that a prohibited supplier cannot simply move on to the next government contract.

Some institutions are already moving beyond identifying and reporting wrongdoing to actively disrupting it. SIU figures show that its interventions in the 2025/26 financial year prevented roughly R1.9 billion (US$115 million) in state losses, and that contracts worth more than R25.7 billion (US$1.5 billion) were set aside through court proceedings it initiated.

Yet legal powers mean little if the institutions entrusted with them lack the capacity or willingness to act. Testimony before the Madlanga Commission exposed some of these difficulties. In September, Public Service Commission Chairperson Somadoda Fikeni testified that just three or four officials were responsible for verifying the financial disclosures of approximately 10 000 senior public servants. He also described weaknesses in vetting and lifestyle audits, including resource shortages, delays and failures to act on warning signs. Even when oversight bodies uncover wrongdoing, their findings may lead nowhere if the bodies receiving their referrals do not respond. Those failures, the ISS argues, should themselves attract scrutiny.

Fragmentation compounds the problem. Powers are dispersed across institutions with varying mandates, priorities and capacity, and information does not always flow easily between them. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy identified over 30 government departments, parliamentary bodies and coordinating mechanisms with responsibilities for preventing and fighting corruption. The National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council recommended retaining this system while strengthening coordination and collaboration between its many parts. Initiatives such as the ISS Anti-Corruption Tracker Information System can identify patterns of corruption and institutional responses, informing earlier intervention, but better information alone cannot ensure that institutions act.

The immediate question when corruption is uncovered, the research suggests, should not simply be whether someone can eventually be prosecuted. It should also be what can lawfully be done now to stop the wrongdoing and prevent further harm. Instead of asking which institution “owns” a corruption matter, the question should be which institutions have relevant powers and what each can lawfully do. The same conduct may raise criminal, tax, procurement, regulatory, disciplinary and civil issues, and subject to the law, several responses may proceed in parallel rather than deferring action until a criminal case starts.

South Africa does not need to wait for more criminal convictions before acting against corruption. Much of the legal authority to intervene already exists. What is needed is the institutional capacity, leadership and political will to use it. And when those entrusted with these powers fail to act, they must be held accountable, because the cost of that failure is borne by the citizens who depend on the services corruption erodes.