Washington's Tariff, Beijing's Offer: Pretoria's Trade Test

Washington’s 30% tariff on South African exports, imposed in August last year, showed how a decision taken in another capital becomes a bill presented to South African workers. Officials warned that tens of thousands of jobs in agriculture and manufacturing were at risk. Nine months later, Beijing opened a different door: from May 1 this year, South African goods may enter China duty-free. The sequence matters. It shows that South Africa’s access to the world’s markets rests on decisions made by others, not on rules it controls.

The temptation, after such a sequence, is to read it as a choice between patrons. One superpower closes a door and another opens one, and the obvious move appears to be walking through China’s door without looking back. But that framing mistakes the problem. South Africa’s difficulty is not that it must pick between Washington and Beijing. Its difficulty is that it holds too little leverage with either.

For years the country has treated its relationships with the superpowers as a fluctuating choice between competing camps. Washington wants one thing, Beijing offers another, and within that dynamic South Africa negotiates, reacts and adjusts. What it has not done is alter the underlying structure, in which its economic security ultimately depends on external actors. That is not strategic autonomy. It is dependence framed as diplomacy, and the trade numbers make the point plainly.

China is South Africa’s largest single trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $36.4bn in 2025. Yet the composition of that relationship deserves scrutiny. South Africa largely sends ores and minerals to China and buys manufactured goods in return. A large trading relationship is not the same as a balanced one. The US matters differently. It bought $16.5bn of South African goods in 2025, including vehicles, automotive parts and agricultural exports, much of it under the preferential access of the African Growth & Opportunity Act. That American concession expired in September 2025 but was extended to the end of this year, and Congress has since voted for a longer extension, though formalities remain as hurdles. Washington has also affirmed that a more modernised Agoa could demand reciprocity from its African partners.

The message from both relationships is uncomfortable for anyone responsible for South Africa’s economic policy. Access to markets is another state’s decision. The question policymakers should therefore ask is not which superpower to trust more, but what would make the country harder to pressure.

The answer is diversification, and the idea has a long institutional pedigree. It stems from the 1955 Bandung Conference, where 29 newly independent Asian and African states gathered to reject the notion that they had to become satellites of competing powers. The objective was never isolation but the preservation of freedom to engage with those powers on one’s own terms. Call it strategic autonomy, name it economic resilience, or simply call it choosing ourselves. The principle is straightforward: South Africa should be able to work with the US without depending on it, and the same with China.

China, for its part, has committed $51bn in support for Africa over three years, focused on industrial development, infrastructure and jobs. Chinese investment is already visible here. Hisense’s appliance plant in Atlantis, built with the China-Africa Development Fund on the site of a factory that closed in 2008, now employs more than 1,000 people and trains local technicians alongside Chinese engineers.

That example points to how investment should be evaluated. The measure should not be the size of the cheque. The questions to ask are how many South Africans are employed, how much technology is transferred, and whether South African companies are entering the supply chain. A Chinese factory is useful because it creates productive capacity, skills and jobs, not because it is Chinese. The same principle should apply to American, European, Indian or any other foreign investment.

The Chinese zero-tariff window is a test of policy discipline. South Africa should use it not merely to sell more commodities but to sell more value, prioritising wine, processed food, manufactured goods and beneficiated minerals. The same logic applies to America. A 30% tariff should not simply trigger another round of diplomatic pleading. It should force the harder question of why losing access to one market can threaten so many jobs.

If a political decision taken in Washington can send shockwaves through the South African economy, that is a finding about vulnerability, and vulnerability demands alternatives. The African Continental Free Trade Area, Asia and the Gulf offer diversification options, while Brics+ and the AU can provide additional platforms for trade, finance and regional value chains.

So what should Pretoria do? Diversify markets, push China’s tariff window towards value-added exports, and ensure foreign direct investment delivers jobs, skills and technology. Above all, ensure that South Africa cannot be held economically hostage. Patronage is not the answer. The answer is to build the leverage to stand on its own two feet.

Annalea Chetty is a postgraduate student at the University of Witwatersrand, specialising in international relations.